The success of the Internet is remarkable in light of the decentralized manner in which it is designed and operated. Unlike small scale networks, the Internet is built and controlled by a large number of disperate service providers who are not interested in any global optimization. Instead, providers simply seek to maximize their own profit by charging users for access to their service. Users themselves also behave selfishly, optimizing over price and quality of service. Game theory provides a natural framework for the study of such a situation. However, recent work in this area tends to focus on either the service providers or the network users, but not both. This paper introduces a new model for exploring the interaction of these two elements, in which network managers compete for users via prices and the quality of service provided. We study the extent to which competition between service providers hurts the overall social utility of the system.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most surprising features of the Internet is how effectively it operates on a global scale, despite the fact that its various components (Autonomous Systems) are operated by separate service providers, each of whom seeks only to maximize their own income. A number of recent papers have considered competitive network design games as simple models of how selfish agents might construct such a network. These models tend to assume a static user population, typically with fixed demands. In this paper we address the fact that the potential network users are just as crucial to the construction of a network as the service providers themselves. Network managers compete for users via prices and the quality of service provided. We propose a simple game to explore a basic question that arises in this situation: how is the quality of service affected when the service providers set prices so as to extract maximum profit? We consider the special case of a graph with parallel links (or scheduling parallel machines), where the quality of the service is modeled as delay that increases linearly with the congestion, and user demand is concave. For such a game, we show that a pure equilibrium exists, and we provide a constant factor bound on the price of anarchy, which roughly speaking measures the inefficiency of competitive play. We give an improved bound for the special case in which delay is a pure congestion effect (when delay is 0 with no congestion).
Selfish routing and network design are two important classes of network games that have received much attention in recent years. In work on selfish routing (or load balancing) [10, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22] users in a network route their traffic selfishly with the aim of minimizing their latency. These papers show bounds on the price of anarchy in the corresponding games, that is, they give bounds on the performance degradation caused by the selfish routing as compared to a centrally designed optimal solution. In these games the sole selfish goal of users is to minimize the delay; in particular, user demand is fixed (independent of the delay in the system), and the network is passive, in that it does not try to effect routing behavior by changing the properties of its edges.
Network games have also been used to try to understand the quality of networks built by selfish agents. The price of anarchy or price of stability for such network creation games were studied under a few related models [5, 6, 13] . Such network creation games aim to model the behavior of agents, such as Autonomous Systems, who seek to build networks. However, the models considered here also assume that demand is fixed, and not dependent on the properties of the contructed network. In particular, network design games typically cannot model congestion effects. Furthermore, these models assume that network builders want to simply build a cheap network satisfying user demand, rather than maximizing their own income by charging users for access to this network.
The primary motivation of this paper is to develop a model that encompasses key aspects of both selfish routing and network design games. Our main result is a small constant bound on the price of anarchy in a game that combines profit-maximizing edge-pricing players with user demand that is sensitive to both prices and congestion. In our model, users perceive the quality of a route (path) in a network via a combination of prices and congestion. Edges have congestion sensitive delays, i.e. the time required to traverse an edge depends on the amount of traffic using it. To this extent, our model extends the work on selfish routing discussed above. However, we will also assume that each edge is operated by a distinct selfish player, who can charge traffic for the use of that edge. Finally, we assume that user demand is affected by the quality of service provided, in that increasing prices and delay lead to decreasing user traffic. We assume that the edges set prices in a selfish manner, aiming to maximize their income. The goal of our work is to quantify the performance degradation caused by selfishness (the price of anarchy) in this model. We show that in the special case of networks with parallel links and linear delays, pure Nash equilibria exist and the price of anarchy is bounded by a small constant.
Our Model.
We define a simple model that combines the issues mentioned above. We consider a network consisting of two nodes s and t, with k parallel links. Each link is controlled by a distinct player, who can charge traffic a price for use of her link. One can also view this game as modeling a type of selfish load balancing problem. Here the edges correspond to machines, and the flow or traffic will selfishly balance between them. Each machine has a load dependent delay, and it can charge a price to all users.
Link i (or machine i) has a latency (or delay) function i(x), indicating the delay experienced by a volume of x traffic using i. We will primarily focus on strictly increasing linear latencies, i.e. i(x) = aix + bi, where ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0. We assume that user experience in routing flow through link i depends on the sum of the price and the latency, which we will call the disutility. More precisely, if player i charges pi and fi volume of flow uses link i, then that flow experiences a disutility of pi + i(fi).
We assume that traffic routes itself selfishly, meaning that traffic will not route along one link if it can switch links and incur a lower disutility. As a result, all traffic will necessarily experience the same disutility.
Finally, we also assume that the total amount of traffic from s to t is dependent on the disutility that traffic experiences; as the disutility increases, the total amount of flow interested in routing from s to t decreases. We model this with a demand function D(y), also referred to as the demand curve, which indicates the amount of flow willing to incur a disutility of y. We will naturally assume that demand D(y) is decreasing in disutility y. We will focus on demand curves that are continuous and concave. Different demand curves are used to model demand in different industries. A concave demand curve is applicable for modeling demand for a service with a comparable alternative (at a high enough price all users will switch to the alternate service).
It will often be useful for us to consider u(x) = D −1 (x), which we call the disutility curve. This measures the disutility that will be tolerated by a volume of x flow. By definition, u(x) is also decreasing and concave. For ease of exposition, we will assume that u(x) is strictly decreasing, but this assumption can be dropped without substantially changing our results.
To define our problem more precisely, we say that a price vector p induces a flow vector f satisfying the following properties.
For any
The first condition ensures that no traffic can decrease its disutility by rerouting. The second condition states that the disutility experienced by any traffic must match the the disutility that is tolerated by the given volume of flow. It is not hard to see that since the demand is continuous and decreasing, such flows always exist, and since latencies are strictly increasing, these flows are unique as well.
We may now complete the definition of the game. Each player i selects a price pi for her link. These prices, together with the latencies and the demand curve, induce a unique flow fi on each link. Players seek to maximize their profit, πi = pi · fi. We say that a set of prices p is at Nash equilibrium if, by changing a single price pi to p i , the resulting flow f does not give player i a larger
For a set of prices, we are interested in measuring the social utility of a given solution. For a solution with prices p inducing total flow F = P j fj , and disutility d, we define the social utility to be
The first term accounts for players' profits, and the second terms represents the utility gathered by the traffic that gets routed. An example of an instance of the game with two links is shown in Figure  1 . The social utility of this instance is indicated by the shaded area. We will be interested in bounding the price of anarchy of this game. If p * is the set of prices that maximizes social utility, then the price of anarchy is the maximum possible ratio of
where the prices p range over the possible equilibrium prices. Note that the total area under u(x) provides an upper bound on the maximum possible social utility. However, to achieve this bound we would need to route the maximum possible traffic volume without incurring any delay. We note that there are other reasonable measures of social ultility; we could have considered either the players' profits or the users' utility as social welfare functions. However, the sum of these two objectives seems the most reasonable if we take the economic perspective, in which money is transferable. Furthermore, under either measure alone, simple examples demonstrate an unbounded price of anarchy.
We can think of our problem as a type of two-stage game where there are two types of players: the owners of the edges, and the users with traffic. In the first stage, the edge-players set prices pi on edges. In the second stage, traffic routes itself selfishly from the source to the sink with respect to new latencies i(x) + pi, where the rate of flow is dictated by the disutility curve. For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the first stage of this game, the game of setting prices, and will assume that players anticipate the flow resulting from their chosen prices. However, the existence and uniqueness of these flows follow directly from observing this connection. Our Results.
• We show that for our pricing game, in a network with parallel links, concave demand and linear delays, there is always a pure Nash equilibrium.
• Furthermore, we bound the price of anarchy in this game by 5.064, even when delays are relaxed to be convex.
• In the special case when delay is exclusively a congestion effect, that is, all links have i(0) = 0, the price of anarchy is bounded by at most 3.125.
Related Work.
In our model traffic evaluates its experience via a combination of price and delay. Modelling traffic as experiencing disutility in terms of price and delay has been studied in the transportation literature as early as in 1920 [18] (see also [7] ) and more recently in a sequence of papers started by Cole, Dodis and Roughgarden [8, 9] (see also [14, 15] ). These works view prices as a tax that is set by a benevolent network manager so as to improve network performance. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2] consider a version of our pricing problem in a monopolistic setting with fixed demand. They assume that all edges are owned by a single service provider, and focus on establishing the existence of an equilibrium and characterizing this equilibrium. More recently, after we obtained our results, the same authors extended their model to oligopolies, while still assuming fixed demand and delays which are exclusively due to congestion, i.e. i(0) = 0 for all i (see [1] ). They thereby analyzed a special case of our model and proved a tight bound of 6/5 for the price of anarchy. Along different lines, Vetta [23] shows a nice bound on the price of anarchy in a two-stage pricing game for facility location. In Vetta's game the players' strategies are the facilities they select, and prices are determined based on the facility locations, much as our prices determine the flow through the system.
There is a large body of economics literature dedicated to understanding the effects of pricing with service delays, with the focus being on establishing the existence of stable equilibria, and considering qualitative properties of equilibria (such as whether improved service leads to improved profit). Lee and Mason [17] consider the most closely related model with identical links and non-uniform users. More complex models are discussed in the recent papers by Allon and Federgruen [4] and Afèche [3] and their references. Just as in our work, these papers assume that user experience depends on a combination of price and delay, and that prices are set by selfish, income-maximizing players. However, these papers consider more complex environments, including heterogeneous users, and situations in which not only prices, but also delays can be used as strategic variables. However, unlike our work, these papers do not provide bounds on the quality degradation caused by selfish pricing.
Paper Organization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we prove that pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. In doing so, we first prove a number of lemmas that will be useful throughout the paper. We present our main result in section 3, where we argue that the price of anarchy in this game is bounded by a small constant. In section 4, we consider alternate classes of demand and latency functions. In particular, we show that pure equilibria may not exist if latencies are convex, although when they do, our price of anarchy result still applies. We also argue that in the presence of convex demand, the price of anarchy may be unbounded.
EXISTENCE OF PURE EQUILIBRIA
We say that a player is content if she has no incentive to deviate from her current price. To prove that pure Nash equilibria exist, it will be critical to relate the price charged by a content player to the flow she receives, and to the slopes of the latency and disutility functions. This is achieved through the following technical lemma, which will also play a key role in later bounding the price of anarchy. 
Observe that equality must hold if the disutility curve is continuously differentiable at F .
Before proving this, we establish some basic results concerning the monotonicity and continuity of this game. We first show that 
The symmetric claim holds if player 1 reduces her price.
PROOF. We will assume without loss of generality that there are at least two players with positive flow, since otherwise the claims are trivial.
1) Suppose the flow on link 1 does not decrease. Then, since the price increased, the disutility must strictly increase. Consider any other link that had positive flow. This link now has greater disutility, and since the price has not changed, must carry more flow. But this implies that both the disutility and total flow have increased, which is a contradiction.
2) Suppose some link i = 1 loses flow. Since pi is unchanged and latencies are strictly increasing, the disutility must strictly decrease. This implies that all links that carried flow must now carry less flow. Since we know that link 1 loses flow, the total flow decreases. But then both the disutility and the total flow have decreased, which is a contradiction.
3) Finally, since flow on any link other than 1 can only increase, the disutility can only increase, and thus the total volume of flow can only decrease.
The next lemma argues that the amount of flow routed along any link is a continuous function of the players' prices. PROOF. The non-increasing part follows from Lemma 2.2. As for continuity, we again prove by contradiction. We will argue that if there is a discontinuity, a small change in price can be found that violates monotonicity of disutility. For some price vector p let pi be a point of discontinuity of fi(·)
th link will decrease by at least ∆ (notice that it must decrease by Lemma 2.2). Since latencies are strictly monotone, the loss of at least ∆ flow decreases the latency on link i by at least some L > 0. Choose < L. Then if player i selects a price of pi + , the resulting latency will more than offset the increase in price. Thus the disutility will strictly decrease, contradicting Lemma 2.2.
Having shown that flow is a continuous function of price, it is not difficult to extend this result to show continuity of profit. Indeed, application of elementary analysis yields the following.
Lemma 2.4 Let
π : R k → R k be the
function mapping a vector of prices p to the vector of profits obtained by the players when they charge the corresponding prices, i.e. π(p) = (π1, . . . , π k ) means that the profit of player i is πi under the price vector p. Then the function π(·) is a continuous function of p.
This continuity allows us to prove Lemma 2.1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1. The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is based on the following observations. For a player i to be content, she must not be able to benefit by changing her price at all. The lemma will follow from observing that, in particular, she will not benefit from very small changes to her price. Intuitively, the gain from an increase in price must be outweighed by the resulting loss of flow. In Figure 2 the shaded boxes indicate the immediate effect of a player increasing or decreasing her price without taking into account the resulting change in flow of the other players. The actual resulting flow depends not only on player i's latency function, but also on the disutility curve (determining how much flow leaves the system altogether), and other players' latencies (determining how much flow they steal). For sufficiently small increases in price, the magnitude of this loss is dictated solely by the local slopes of these curves, resulting in the first inequality. Likewise, the second inequality follows by considering a small decrease in price.
More formally, let us prove the second inequality. The proof for the first one is analogous. Assume that player i changes her price so that the system disutility is decreased by a tiny amount δ > 0. Then the flow of a player j = i will decrease by δ/aj and the total flow in the system will increasey by −δ/v + 1 . Hence player i's flow must increase by ∆fi = δ( P j =i
. This increase in flow will result to a latency increase of ai · δ( P j =i
. We next observe that for any > 0, there exists a small enough δ such that, ∆pi/∆fi ≥ pi/fi − . Indeed, if ∆pi/∆fi < pi/fi − then pi∆fi > fi∆pi + fi∆fi . Now player i can obtain more profit by setting her price to pi −∆pi, because her new profit would be (pi − ∆pi)(fi + ∆fi) = pifi − fi∆pi + pi∆fi − ∆pi∆fi > pi · fi if we choose δ small enough to ensure that fi > ∆pi (which we can do due to continuity of latencies and demand). But this can not happen, since player i was content. Thus in the limit of δ approaching 0 we get ∆pi/∆fi ≥ pi/fi.
Therefore as δ tends to 0,
We can now analyze the best response function β : R k → R k . This function maps a price vector p to another price vector p , such that p i maximizes player i's profit assuming all other players price as in p. We define player i's best response to be pi = 0 if there is no price at which i can derive a positive profit. We will use Lemma 2.1 to show that a player's best response is unique, and hence the β(p) is well defined. This and the continuity of β(·) will be sufficient to prove the existence of pure equilibria.
Lemma 2.5 For any set of existing prices p, all players' best response is unique (and hence the β(p) is well defined). Furthermore β(·) is a continuous function of p.
PROOF. Suppose that the best response for some player i is not unique, and let p i > p i be two best response prices for player i. Let f and f be the corresponding flow vectors when player i selects prices p i and p i respectively, with corresponding total flow F and F . Lemma 2.2 implies that f i < f i and F < F . Let v denote the right slope of u(·) at F and v denote left slope of u(·) at F . By concavity of u(·), v ≥ v (recall that both values are negative).
Since both pi and p i are best responses for player i, we can apply Lemma 2.1:
This is a contradiction, and thus a players best response must be unique. The continuity of β(·) is a direct consequence of the continuity of π(·) (Lemma 2.4).
1 To be formal, we have to take a sequence of δ's approaching 0.
Since there is a maximum price P such that any player charging above P gathers no profit, we can restrict our attention on β(·) to the convex and compact region [0, P ] k . Thus we can apply Brouwer's fixed point theorem and thereby prove the following.
Theorem 2.6
The network pricing game has a Nash equilibrium.
PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section we prove our main result, namely that selfish behavior on the part of the players yields a social utility that is within a small constant factor of optimal. More formally, we prove The first step is to take a general instance of a game with prices at Nash equilibrium, and create a new game instance in which the equilibrium gathers no traffic utility (see Figure 3) . In doing this we preserve the original equilibrium, and only increase the price of anarchy. Now, in this modified game, we can bound the social utility of an optimal solution solely against the player profit at Nash equilibria.
We will consider a general instance of the game with disutility function u and latencies i(·) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We assume we have a price vector p at Nash equilibrium, with induced flow vector f , total flow volume F and disutility d.
Lemma 3.2 Define a new disutility curve
Then prices p are also at Nash equilibrium given this truncated demand curve, and the price of anarchy of this instance has not decreased.
PROOF. Clearly no player has an incentive to decrease her price, as this would increase the total flow, and thus yield a flow vector that was achievable under u(x). But we assumed that p was at equilibrium for u(x), so this can not benefit any player. Furthermore, no player has in incentive to increase their price, as the potential gain of any such move is strictly smaller than it would have been prior to the truncation.
As for the price of anarchy, note that this truncation destroys all traffic utility of the given equilibrium, as shown in Figure 3 . But this is also an upper bound on the decrease in the social utility of the new optimal solution under the truncated disutility curve. Thus the price of anarchy can only increase.
The next lemma provides a simple lower bound on the price that players charge at equilibrium, both in terms of the system disutility d and their own latency function. This result will clearly be useful in lower bounding player profits in the Nash equilibrium. PROOF. For simplicity, we will assume we have a truncated disutility curve, although the lemma is also true without this assumption. Define q = d − bi. We will claim that if player i charged pi < q 2 , then she can increase her profit by charging q 2 . Observe that ai · fi + bi + pi = d. Thus we can express
w(x) (a) (b) Figure 3 : A disutility curve with prices and flows at equilibrium and the corresponding truncated curve.
However, since we are assuming a truncated demand curve, in charging q 2 , the resulting flow f would be determined solely by i(x). Hence, f satisfies the same condition, i.e. ai · f i + bi + We now prove our main result. We consider an instance of our game with equilibrium prices p, and corresponding flow vector f , total flow F , and disutility d. We assume that our disutility function u(x) is truncated as in Lemma 3.2, i.e. u(x) = d on the interval [0, F ], and thus U (p) is represented entirely by player profit.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. As observed, in our truncated instance of the game, the given Nash equilibrium generates no traffic utility. Thus we must bound both the player profit and traffic utility of the optimal solution against the profit of the players at Nash equilibrium. We will consider an optimal price vector p * , with corresponding flows f * , F * , and disutility value d * . We can trivially bound the traffic utility of the optimal solution by F * · (d − d * ), and we can attribute f * i · (d − d * ) of this bound to each player i. Thus we will think of each player i in the optimal solution as contributing . Otherwise, we will say a player is shallow. We will now argue that there is at most one shallow player. Then we will show that the contribution of a steep player i to the optimal solution can be bounded in terms of πi. Finally, we consider two cases regarding the shallow player's latency. In both cases, we show that the contribution of this shallow player to the optimal solution can be bounded within a constant factor of the sum of the profits of all the players at Nash equilibrium.
Let v + be the right slope of u(x) at F . Consider any shallow player i. By Lemma 2.1, we know that (
Since i is shallow, the first term is greater than
is negative, so for all j = i we must have aj > p i 2f i > ai, as otherwise the above inequality would be violated. This implies that i must have the unique minimum slope, and thus i must be the only shallow player.
Consider a steep player j. As in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can argue that the optimal solution can not gather more value than πj by charging more than pj, as then the player could selfishly do the same. Thus we only need to consider how the optimal solution might benefit by having p * j < pj. By assumption, aj ≥ 1 2
The maximum feasible rectangle (corresponding to gathered utility) that is bounded above by u(x) and below by j (x) has an area of 1.125πj , which is achieved when aj = pj and inducing a flow of 3 4 fj . Thus nearly all players gather almost as much utility as they would in an optimal solution. Now we are left with the task of bounding the value gathered by the shallow player i in the optimal solution. We again know that to gather more value with i, the optimal solution must charge a lower price and carry more flow, as any benefit in raising the price could also be realized by the player at equilibrium. Thus our concern is that somehow the optimal solution sends a huge amount of flow at lower price on i, thereby gathering substantially larger social utility. We consider two cases, based on just how shallow i's latency is. (thereby maximizing the area of a rectangle inscribed in a triangle). Given our condition on i, this can be shown to yield a profit of at most 3.52πi.
Case 2: i(4fi) − i(fi) ≤ pi/4. This case deals with a very shallow latency. A trivial upper bound on the amount that the optimal solution can gather through i is
where r is defined by u(r) = i(fi). This is the value i could gather in the absence of other players if i(x) never exceeded i(fi). We will partition this area into two regions; A, representing R r F (u(x)− i(fi))dx, and B, representing the rest, with area F (d − i(fi)), as shown in Figure 4 (a).
To bound A, recall that ai < 1 2
. Since the slope of i's latency is shallow, the disutility curve must be relatively steep, as otherwise, i could decrease pi slightly and dramatically increase fi. More precisely, Lemma 2.1 implies that
. Since u(x) is concave, the area in A can be upper bounded by a triangle of height pi and slope v + . This has area at most pi · fi = πi.
To bound B, we partition the steep players (all j = i) into two classes. Let S − be the set of all players j for whom bj > i(fi) + pi/2, and let S + consist of all remaining steep players, as shown in Figure 4 (b). Define F − and F + to be the total flow carried by all players in S − and S + respectively at equilibrium. By Lemma 3.3, we know that for any player j ∈ S + , pj ≥ (d − bj)/2, and hence the total profit of all players in S + is at least piF + /4. Furthermore, we can argue that S − must be small, as if it was very large, player i would have an incentive to undercut all the players in S − . In particular, we claim that F − ≤ 3fi. Otherwise, player i would have an incentive to charge a quarter of her current price. Due to the above shallowness condition on her latency, she is guarranteed to more than quadruple her flow before any player in S − routes any traffic. Clearly this would generate more profit, contradicting our assumption of equilibrium. Thus we can bound the total area of B by 4πi + 4 P j =i πj. The combined area of A and B is thus at most 5πi + 4 P j =i πj, and hence the optimal solution can gather a value of no more than 5πi + 5.125 P j =i πj. Thus the price of anarchy is at most 5.125. If we return to our bound on the area of B, note that we can generalize our definition of S − to be the set of all players j for whom bj > i(fi) + αpi for some real α, and define S + similarly. Optimizing over α yields the desired bound of 5.064.
For the special case when i(0) = 0 for all i, a proof similar to the one above yields the following To conclude this section we show that the price of anarchy is lower bounded by 3/2. PROOF. Consider the disutility curve u(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and u(x) = 2 − x for 1 ≤ x ≤ 2 and let the player have zero latency. Then she would obtain maximal profit of 1 by charging a price of 1 for a social value of 1. Yet the optimal solution can gather a social value of 3/2 by charging 0. Hence the lower bound. Finally, it is not difficult to slightly modify this example to ensure (strict) monotonicity of latency and demand curves.
Remark:
It is not difficult to prove that for a single player the bound 3/2 is tight.
EXTENSIONS AND RELATED MODELS
In this section we analyze what happens to the network pricing game when we relax the assumptions on the latency functions and the demand curve. First, we consider convex, as opposed to linear, latency functions, while retaining concave demand.
Unfortunately, the network pricing game with convex latencies and concave demand curve may not have a Nash equilibrium as illustrated by the following 2-player example. Let the disutility curve be the unit box: u(x) = 1 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and u(x) = 0 otherwise. Define the players' latencies as 1(x) = 0 for all x, and 2(x) = 1/3 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/3 and 2(x) = ∞ otherwise. We claim that this instance of the game has no Nash equilibrium. Indeed, assume that there is a Nash equilibrium with total disutility d. If d ≤ 1/3 then the first player must make a profit of no more than 1/3. Yet she has a guaranteed profit of 2/3 if by charging 1. If d > 1/3, then for the second player to be content, she has to charge a price of d − 1/3, and thus the first player can earn a profit of at most 2d/3 by charging d. But then if the first player reduces her price slightly to d − then all the flow will route through her link and she will earn a profit of d − > 2d/3. Hence the game has no Nash equilibrium. Although the above example violates continuity and strict monotonicity of the latency functions and the demand curve, it is not difficult to alter it slightly so as to satisfy these conditions while still maintaining the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, when such a network pricing game does have a Nash equilibrium, the proofs of the previous sections can be extended to yield the same bounds on the price of anarchy. We next consider instances of the game with convex, instead of concave, demand curves, while maintaining convex latencies. An example similar to the one above can be constructed to show that this game may still not have a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, unlike the game with concave demand curves, even when Nash equilibria do exist, we do not have any such bounds, as there exist examples with unbounded gap between the social utility of a Nash equilibrium and an optimal solution.
